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 Abstract  
This document will review the literature that provides information about growing in-
equality and formal institutions, taking as a starting point the evolution of inequality and 
then connecting it with formal institutions, analyzing their effects on inequality. The col-
lected data belong to the period 2011-2016 of many countries of the world with vari-
ables that influence inequality and represent formal institutions, such as: Voice and ac-
countability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and, finally, Control of corruption; We will look at the 
effects of these variables on inequality to see how having good government affects or 
not. 
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THE ROLE OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS ON  ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
1. Introduction 
Is inequality present in our societies nowadays? Is it easily recognizable? How does 
inequality affect? Do formal institutions influence the level of inequality? Are there 
remedies to reduce inequality between rich and poor? 
These questions are very important for all people who live in society. However, they 
are difficult to answer. The objective of this paper is to obtain concise answers as they 
are topics that are increasingly present in national and international consultations and it 
is one of the most important topics in the socio-economic world, needing to be re-
solved. 
Inequality has been measured in the vast majority of analyzes and empirical work 
through the Gini index, which presents a moderate level of inequality in developed 
countries if we compared with developing countries, which present very high levels.It is 
natural and it is known that a certain degree of inequality favors growth and gives rise 
to individual successes as a reward for the effort made. But high levels of inequality 
can turn against us and cause damage to political systems, damage social cohesion 
causing civil conflicts and can cause economic instability, among other consequences. 
Apart from the generic consequences that inequality can bring, we will focus on the 
variations that can occur when formal institutions come into play. Formal institutions are 
the rules of the game of a society, the rules that control social interactions(Mantzavi-
nos, North and Shariq ,2015).Various factors have been studied, such as economic 
freedom (McMullen et al., 2008), governance (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014), among 
others. However, we have focused the efforts of our analysis on studying the effects of 
government quality on inequality. 
At present, the headlines of the news are covered by corruption cases of govern-
ments or companies, existing police violence such as in the US for racial issues or in 
Spain by separatist or unionist ideologies; for these reasons, in our analysis we will 
study the quality of government through six indicators of The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) which are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and, finally, Con-
trol of corruption. This decomposition of the quality of government is considered the 
most reliable and accurate way to achieve a quality and faithful image about how to 
govern (Kaufmann, Kraay y Mastruzzi, 2010).  
  
We carry out the analysis through three types of estimates: Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares, Fixed Effects and Random Effects, among other contrasts such as individua-
lly, that is, of each variable to check the importance of these factors for inequality. The 
results that our contrasts show is that, individually, the government quality variables, 
such as “Control of Corruption” or “Rule of Law”, do influence inequality in such a way 
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that the level of inequality decreases when there is a better quality of government. Ho-
wever, when we perform joint contrasts we find that the best estimate according to our 
calculations is the estimate by Fixed Effects, which may be due to the temporal limita-
tion of our data. 
In the next section, we will present the literature review. In this review, we analyze at 
first the importance of inequality and its study, as well as main concepts to understand 
our analysis well; we also offer an explanation about the Gini index as a measure of 
inequality and formal institutions trying to offer a theoretical and historical basis.In sec-
tion 3 we explain the variables that we have used in the empirical analysis, the collec-
ted data and graphs in which we can observe the most important results.In section 4 
we explain the methodology applied to make the required calculations and the different 
regressions with our variables of interest. After this, we analyze the results obtained. In 
section 5 we conclude our work with the ideas that we can extract from our results. Fi-
nally, after the conclusion, we will find the bibliographic references used throughout the 
work. 
2.Literature review 
2.1 The importance of studying inequality. 
The initial questions in the previous section refer to inequality / income inequality, 
being a central issue in political and economic research, as it is considered "one of the 
greatest social, economic and political challenges of our time" (The Economist, 2012). 
There are many reasons for giving such importance to inequality: for example, it has 
been linked to the malfunctioning of political systems, the lack of economic freedom 
and lower economic growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Stiglitz, 2013; Picketty, 
2014). In addition, inequality has been considered a driver of environmental degrada-
tion, crime, poor health and a wide range of social problems. (Picketty and Wilkinson, 
2009, 2015; Baland and Bardhan., 2007)  Throughout the world, the gap between the 
rich and the poor is at its highest level in decades. Oxfam (2018) recently reported that 
42 individuals have the same wealth as the lowest 50% of the world population, or 
what is the same, 3,700 million people; In addition, 82% of all economic growth created 
in 2017 went to the richest 1% of the population, while the poorest 50% did not see any 
increase at all. In the United States, things have been even more extreme, since 95% 
of the income growth between 2009 and 2012 was aimed at the richest 1% of the po-
pulation. (Saez, 2014). As summarized by Markus (2017), we are faced with "increa-
singly pronounced social hierarchies and growing global inequality." Although it is logi-
cal to think, and widely recognized, that a certain degree of inequality is necessary to 
reward the most productive agents and with more capacity in order to move forward in 
life, inequality at higher levels has negative consequences within a society. In the re-
cent study, (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) affirms that inequality: erodes the functioning and 
quality of political systems since political power can be concentrated in the hands of a 
small part of society, the elite ; increases the risk of financial crisis, causing economic 
instability and reducing growth; hinders the reduction of poverty; and it can damage 
social cohesion and provoke civil and social conflicts as it reduces opportunities for the 
poor and also the mobility of income between generations. 
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In addition, there is an abundance of studies about inequality and the consequences 
that this entails, such as, for example, Rufrancos, Power, Pickett and Wilkinson (2013) 
demonstrated the positive relationship between inequality and homicide rates, that is, if 
we have more inequality, we will see how the homicides in a country increase; also the 
highest levels of childhood obesity have been associated in a similar way with higher 
levels of economic inequality. (Stamatakis, Zaninotto, Falaschetti, Mindell & Head, 
2010) ; positive links have also been established between inequality and mental illness, 
including schizophrenia and depression(por ejemplo, Burns, Tomita y Kapadia, 2014; 
Johnson, Wibbels y Wilkinson, 2015). Inequality can also affect institutional quality. 
This has been investigated in works for several years, as in Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) and 
Sonin (2003), which suggest that an equitable distribution of income, that is, a level of 
minimum or moderate-low inequality, is a more fertile ground in which good institutions 
can grow.The first of these studies presents a static framework of institutional subver-
sion; the second, suggests an institutional vehicle for the negative effect of inequality in 
growth, whereby low quality institutions are related to a greater inclination of the balan-
ce towards the rich in terms of the redistribution of wealth. 
 Likewise, we need an index, a variable to be able to measure economic inequa-
lity. There are several indices to measure inequality. Throughout history, the index that 
has been used the most, including at governmental levels to carry out statistics and 
policies, is the Gini index ( Lyon, Cheung & Gastwirth, 2016).  The Gini index is a well-
known measure in the field of economic study that is used to measure inequality (Alli-
son, 1978). The Gini coefficient varies between 0 (case of perfect equality) and 1 (per-
fect inequality); that is, it is equal to 0 if all individuals have the same income value and 
equal to 1 if all people except one have income 0 and that person has the total amount 
of income. (Giorgi & Gigliarano, 2016).   
2.2 Institutions and their influence on inequality. 
Before relating the concepts of institution and inequality, we must ask ourselves: 
what is an institution? There are many possible definitions that have been given over 
the decades, but in our analysis we are going to borrow the one presented in the work 
of Matzavinos, North, Douglass and Shariq (2015): "Institutions are the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, the restrictions devised by humans that structure 
human interaction.They consist of formal rules (constitutions, statutes, common law 
and regulations), informal rules (conventions, moral rules and social norms), and the 
characteristics of each of them in terms of how society enforces them. As these rules 
establish the incentive structure of a society, they define the way in which the game 
develops over time. " As they say, institutions are the "rules of the game", the rules of a 
society. But now, not all rules are imposed in the same way.Literature generally distin-
guishes two types of institutions: formal and informal. (North, 1990). To understand the 
meaning, we can say that the formal can be understood as rules, whether regulatory, 
political or economic, which facilitate exchanges.Informals are norms that have not 
been designed as such, they simply come from what is transmitted socially, through the 
so-called culture (North, 1990). 
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Once we know the concepts of 'inequality' and 'institutions', we can focus on the 
preceding studies that show the institutions and / or the inequality between them or 
with other concepts, which can serve as a guide when understanding better our analy-
sis.Literature tries to relate institutions with entrepreneurship since the end of the 20th 
century, but we will pay more attention to the most recent works.  For example, factors 
such as governance (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014), economic freedom (McMullen 
et al., 2008), property rights and financial capital (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008), entry 
regulation (Klapper et al., 2006) and control of corruption (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009) 
are several key institutional factors considered. Also McMullen et al. (2008) shows how 
the institutional sphere influences the opportunity and the need to undertake in different 
ways. Bowen and De Clercq (2008) show how financing and education positively affect 
the allocation of business resources and, on the other hand, the corruption of a country 
has a negative influence.Similarly, Anokhin and Schulze (2009) demonstrate how con-
trolling corruption increases the confidence of agents in government, fostering innova-
tion and business activity. Recent studies show that if there are high levels of corrup-
tion, more government activity and weaker property rights, the potential growth of en-
trepreneurs diminishes (Estrin et al., 2013). 
Particularly, the quality in the way of governing and, in general, the quality of the ins-
titutions, is vital to understand up to what level political decentralization can harm the 
individual welfare (Rodríguez-Pose, & Tselios, 2019).The World Bank (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010) carries out a decomposition of the quality of governments 
through the construction of 6 pillars: voice and responsibility, political stability and ab-
sence of violence / terrorism, effectiveness of the government, regulatory quality, state 
of law and control of corruption; These indicators are considered the most accurate and 
reliable indexes to obtain an image of quality in the way of governing .According to 
Sánchez and Goda (2018) there are studies that analyze corruption as an alternative 
explanation to the differences between countries in the redistribution of income. We 
make a point here because we are talking about the concept of income redistribution, 
which we can relate directly to inequality, and in particular, to inequality between coun-
tries. 
Since the last decade of the twentieth century, numerous studies have been published 
in which a new concept appears, the "Quality of Government" (QoG), this being an im-
portant determinant of a large number of variables related to welfare of people within a 
country (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente, 2014). This indicator is born of the evident 
attention that has increased in recent years and, in addition, we must add the interest 
shown by some international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Na-
tions, which have emphasized the importance of the value of good governance and the 
possession of solid institutions (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). This has 
caused the creation of new data, and in particular of the most measurable aspects of 
“Quality of Government” : such as the control of corruption, the strength of the rule of 
law and bureaucratic quality (Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente, 2014). The correlation bet-
ween these indicators in several countries is so high that the term "quality of govern-
ment" has been coined to synthesize the concept of a government that is non-corrupt, 
impartial and efficient (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Countries with a high "quality of 
government" have higher scores in almost all areas related to citizens' welfare (Holm-
berg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). According to the study by Charron, Dijkstra, and 
Lapuente (2014): "those regions where the quality of life is perceived as low by its own 
citizens, are those same regions that have the worst performance in the standard indi-
	  6
cators of human development . A tentative normative conclusion would therefore be 
that, in addition to existing transfer policies, a joint effort aimed at improving “Quality of 
Government” in those regions with lower levels could substantially improve the econo-
mic prospects of these regions and the lives of their regions residents. " 
In Chong and Gradstein (2004) they relate our two key concepts, inequality and institu-
tions, reaching the following conclusions: based on the fact that in their analysis there 
is a significant correlation between income inequality and (low) institutional quality, it is 
reasonable to think that "Weak institutions can lead to income inequality" (Chong and 
Gradstein, 2004). For example, according to Chong and Gradstein (2004), when poor 
citizens are not given the protection of an independent judicial system, their capacity to 
obtain income is lower than that of wealthy citizens. It has also been suggested in 
Chong and Gradstein (2004), that a high inequality (of income) leads the rich to exert a 
more powerful influence and political pressure, and in this way, they transform the insti-
tutions so that they benefit the collective of rich citizens. 
3.Measuring economic inequality and formal institutions. 
Our benchmark for measuring economic inequality is the Gini index, as we mentioned 
in the previous section. The inequality index data are measured from 0 to 100, 0 points 
being the non-existence of inequality and 100 points the maximum level of inequality 
that can be achieved. On the other hand, in order to carry out the contrast of empirical 
form about the effects that formal institutions have with inequality, we have turned to 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). (https://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home). The WGI contains global governance indicators at both the individual and 
aggregate levels. The Worldwide Governance indicators differentiates six dimensions 
of governance: Voice and accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and, finally, Control of co-
rruption. In our analysis we have used these variables as representatives of formal ins-
titutions and also control variables, to avoid the possible bias of our variables of inter-
est. 
3.1 Variables’ types in our model. 
As we have already mentioned, the WGI has six indicators in total to refer to the quality 
or way of governing. We have obtained within these indices data from 2011 to 2016, 
which will allow us to see the evolution of the institutions, to observe if there are chan-
ges in our dependent variable and in what sense they do it in a sample of countries 
around the world, which are: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, 
Denmark, Slovakia, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Holland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Ro-
mania, Sweden, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Repu-
blic, Ecuador, Honduras, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Panama, El Salvador, Thailand, Tur-
key and Ukraine. 
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First, regarding the indicators that refer to the quality of government, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence measures the perception of the existing probability of political 
instability and / or violence for political reasons, including terrorism. This index, like the 
six indicators of good governance, is estimated in a range of -2.5 to +2.5, meaning -2.5 
a weak government with political instability and presence of violence and / or terrorism 
and reaching up to +2.5, this being a strong government, that is, stable politically and 
without violence. Second, the Government Effectiveness reflects perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of public administration and the degree of inde-
pendence of political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the commitment to said policies. Third, Rule of Law reflects the 
perceptions of the extent to which agents entrust and respect the rules of society, and 
in particular, the quality of compliance of contractors, property rights, police and courts, 
as well as the probability of crime and violence. Fourth, Regulatory Quality refers to the 
perceptions of the government's capacity to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that allow and promote the development of the private sector. Fifth, 
Voice and Accountability, which reflects the perceptions of the extent to which the citi-
zens of a country can participate in the selection of their government, as well as free-
dom of expression, freedom of association and free media. Sixth and last, as regards 
the institutional independent variables, we have Control of Corruption that reflects the 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised to obtain private profits, 
including small and large forms of corruption, as well as the "Capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. 
In addition, we have introduced a new variable called "Totqog". This variable is formed 
from the annual average of each of the six "Quality of Government" indicators of the 
model. By creating this variable we seek to have a total measure of government quality 
that we can directly compare with inequality. 
Apart from our dependent variable represented by the Gini index and the variables that 
represent the formal institutions of our model, we have included control variables. We 
have introduced these types of variables to control the possible biases towards our de-
pendent variable, that is, with the purpose of eliminating or neutralizing its effects in our 
variable to be explained. We have introduced a total of four control variables: 
 - GDP per capita (in $ currency) 
  
 - Population growth (annual %) 
 - Unemployment (% of total labor force) 
 - School enrollment, secondary (% net) 
First, GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided by the population, with the 
data in current US dollars. Second, population growth is the annual growth rate of the 
population for the year 't', that is, the exponential growth rate of the half-year population 
from the year 't-1' through year t, expressed in percentage.This index counts all resi-
dents regardless of their legal status or citizenship. Third, the Unemployment control 
variable refers to the proportion of the workforce that is unemployed but available and 
looking for work. It is measured as a percentage of the total workforce. Finally, School 
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enrollment is the net enrollment rate of children of official school age who are enrolled 
in school with respect to the total population of the corresponding official school age. It 
is also measured in percentage. 
Once we know all the variables that are present in our analysis, it is necessary to spec-
ify the name that these variables take in our model: 
 - Gin : Gini index 
 - GDPpc : Gross Domestic Product per capita 
 - Popgro : Population growth 
 - Unem: Unemployment 
 - School: School enrollment 
 - Control : Control of corruption  
 - Polabs : Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
 - Goveff : Government Effectiveness 
 - Rulaw : Rule of Law 
 - Voiaccount : Voice and Accountability 
 - Regqua : Regulatory Quality 
 - Totqog : Total average quality of government 
Knowing the nomenclature of the variables, we present a table below as a summary of 
the statistical panel data of our model, in which we can observe the standard deviation, 
the mean and the minimum and maximum: 
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    Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
    Source: own elaboration. 
We can see in Table 1 how the independent variables that represent the formal institu-
tions show data with a minimum of -2 from "Polabs" and a maximum from "Control" of 
2.40, this being the variable that presents the highest standard deviation of the six that 
are measured in the same numerical parameters. In addition, this set of variables is 
between 0'3 and 0'7 in terms of the average of each of the variables, which would indi-
cate that each of the measures for each country has an average of approved in terms 
of quality of government. We can also observe this with the variable "Totqog", which 
presents an average of 0.56. In this way we can anticipate that we are analyzing a 
sample of developed countries but with clear deficiencies in some index of governabi-
lity of some of them. 
In the Graph 1 we carry out the representation of the relationship between our depen-
dent variable 'Gin' and our independent variable 'Totqog'. The data of both variables 
are in the time frame, that is, between 2011 and 2016 for each country of the analysis. 
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  Graph 1: Scatter plot about Gini index and Political Stability. 
 
    Source: own elaboration 
As we have said, we observe the relationship between the Gini index and the average 
of the total "Quality of Government" of each country. We can see that as the level of 
government quality rises, inequality is lower. That is, there is a negative relationship 
between institutions and inequality, since as the quality of institutions increases, 
inequality falls. In fact, when "Totqog" increases from 0 approximately, there is a sharp 
drop in inequality without reaching 40 points, due to better government.  
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  Table 2. Correlation Panel Data 2011-2016 
 
   Source: own elaboration. 
In the correlations table we can see how there are a great majority of positive signs, 
although negative ones are also present. The highest negative correlation is the one 
that relates the variable "School" and "Gin" of -0.6828. On the other hand, we have 
very high positive correlations, especially among the institutional variables and the ave-
rage quality of government "Totqog". It is logical that the correlations between these 
variables are high since they represent data that are closely related, in this case, about 
the quality of government. In fact, the highest is almost a perfect positive correlation 
between "Rulaw" and "Totqog", being 0.9858. 
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Next, we will perform an econometric analysis that will allow us to verify these rela-
tionships and know if they are significant or not. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Methodology 
The main objective of this study is to analyze to what extent the variations produced in 
"Gin", that is, the Gini index in representation of inequality, are associated with changes 
in the variables that represent the formal institutions of our model. To carry out the em-
pirical analysis we will use three types of econometric methodologies, namely: Pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effects and Random Effects. During the analysis, we 
will try to analyze the different influences and the significance of the different variables 
and compare them. 
First of all we carry out a particular analysis of each variable to check the influence and 
the significance they have on the "Gini index" and thus, be able to affirm exactly if they 
are important for inequality or not. Secondly, we will carry out several regressions with 
different sets of variables to compare the results of the estimates and analyze the diffe-
rences between them. We have two groups of variables as we have already mentio-
ned, the control variables and the variables that represent our formal institutions and 
also the variable "Totqog" representing the average of the sum of the 6 institutional va-
riables. In the first phases we will use the method of Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
and to finish the study we will make several estimations through Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects that allow us to have a stronger evidence to make the conclusions 
more solid. 
4.2 Model and results 
In this first part of the analysis, we estimate the following individual models to study the 
significance of each of the variables with our inequality index ( the numbering of the 
following equations is directly related to the numbering of the screenshots of the pro-
gram as follows: (1) -> [10], (2) -> [11], and so on.) : 
(1) !  
(2) !  
(3) !  
(4) !  
(5) !  
Gini,t = B0 + B1Control + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1Polabs + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1Govef f + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1Rulaw + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1Voiceaccount + ui,t
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(6) !  
(7) !  
(8) !  
(9) !  
(10) !  
(11) !  
Through these estimations we try to identify the individual relationship of each variable 
with the Gini index ("Gin"). We want to analyze if an increase or decrease in the value 
of these variables translates into an increase or decrease in the Gini index. The signs 
we expect from each of the !  vary according to the independent variable: of the equa-
tions (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (11) we expect a negative sign because as 
these variables increase, this will translate into a decrease in inequality since they are 
the variables of good government, including the total average of these and two of the 
control variables, "GDPpc" and "School" which it is reasonable to think that if any of 
these factors increases in any unit, it will cause a decrease in the level of inequality. As 
Chong and Gradstein (2004) state: “ weak institutions can lead to income inequality”. 
On the other hand, we expect a positive sign from the remaining equations, because 
when we increase any of these variables, it is logical to intuit that inequality will increa-
se. We also expect that the coefficients of determination are related to the correlation 
between the variables analyzed previously and, thus, we expect them to be all elevated 
. 
In the regressions that we will see next we tested the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cient in the different indicators is equal to zero (Ho: β = 0) and the alternative that the 
coefficient is different from zero (H1: β ≠ 0). The levels of significance chosen are: 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). We present Table 3, which shows the results of the first eight 
regressions. 
   
Gini,t = B0 + B1Regqua + ui,t
Gini,T = B0 + B1Totqog + ui,t
Gini,t = BO + B1GDPpc + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1Popgro + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1Unem + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1School + ui,t
β1
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   Source: own elaboration 
It is necessary to emphasize that there is a previous work, the Breusch-Pagan test of 
heteroscedasticity, which revealed that it is present in our models. To solve this, we ca-
rry out the calculation of robust standard errors and, in this way, the probability of rejec-
ting the null hypothesis when it should not be rejected is lower. We have done this pro-
cess for all the regressions of our model. (We attach an example of this process in the 
appendix for the variable "Control", "Appendix, Image 1). 
The results obtained do not vary too much of the expected since all the institutional va-
riables and also the average ("totqog") present negative coefficients with values bet-
ween 3'15 and 4'7, being this reasonable because they represent measures of "quality 
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of government" ", It is to be assumed that inequality will decrease, since it is an impor-
tant determinant of a multitude of societal welfare variables within a country (Charron, 
Dijkstra and Lapuente, 2014).  On the other hand, there is a sign that contradicts our 
predictions: the sign of the variable "Unem" is negative, which does not make much 
economic sense because we would be affirming that as unemployment increases, 
inequality decreases, something contradictory in social terms. economic however, as it 
is not significant, we will not take it into account. Regarding the significance of our va-
riables, we can affirm that they are all significant at 1% in the individual contrast except 
the variable "Unem". 
Next, we will divide the variables into three groups to see how the significance has va-
ried, the sign of our coefficients and the importance of the variables throughout the 
analysis. Equation (12) contains only the institutional independent variables without the 
control variables, equation (13) contains only the independent control variables and the 
average of the sum of the government quality indicators ("Totqog") and, finally, the 
equation ( 14) contains all the variables of our model except "Totqog" since it would not 
be logical to include a total average variable within a model with our variables of inter-







In the same way as in the previous section, we have performed the Breusch-Pagan 
test to see if there is heteroscedasticity, and indeed, we have rejected the null hypothe-
sis of non-existence of heteroscedasticity. Therefore, we have been forced to calculate 
robust standard errors. Furthermore, as before, we have proposed the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient is equal to zero (Ho: β = 0) and the alternative hypothesis that the 
coefficient is different from 0 (H1: β ≠ 0). The chosen levels of significance for our test 
are again 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
In the first place, the variables that we are going to analyze in this section are only the 
independent variables that represent the institutions: "Control", "Polabs", "Goveff", "Ru-
law", "Voiaccount" and "Regqua". 
Gini,t = B0 + B1Control + B2Polabs + B3Govef f + B4Rulaw + B5Voiaccount + B6Regqua + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1Control + B2Polabs + B3Govef f + B4Rulaw + B5Totqog + ui,t
Gini,t = B0 + B1Control + B2Polabs + B3Govef f + B4Rulaw + B5Voiaccount + B6Regqua + B7GDPpc + B8Popgro + B9Unem + B1,0 School + ui,t
	  17
     Table 4. OLS Robust Data Panel I 
  
   Source: own elaboration 
In Table 4 we observe our independent variables representing the formal institutions, 
which are significant at 1% all except "Regqua", which is significant at 5%. Regarding 
the signs, we find half of them negative from "Polabs", "Goveff" and "Rulaw", which fits 
with our literature and logic since, being indicators of good governance, they should 
decrease the inequality. On the other hand, we found positive signs from "Control", 
"Voiaccount" and "Regqua", which is not very logical since if, for example, if control of 
corruption increases, it must necessarily translate into a decrease in inequality, keeping 
everything else constant, ceteris paribus. These results contradict, for example, what 
Anokhin and Schulze (2009) demonstrated, that by controlling corruption, citizens' con-
fidence in government increases, promoting innovation and business activity. However, 
we will continue with the other regressions before drawing conclusions. What is unde-
niable is that our model has certain limitations. 
Secondly, we have introduced the control variables and our total average variable of 
the quality of the institutions in order to see the significance of "Totqog" and how it 
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could affect the level of inequality. We have returned and the results obtained appear in 
Table 5. 
   Table 5. OLS Robust Data Panel II 
     
    Source: own elaboration 
The variable "Totqog" does not come out as significant, therefore, its effect on the de-
pendent variable is not important. In this section we can also see how the four control 
variables are significant at 1% and the signs are the expected ones. 
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Thirdly, once the variables were analyzed, differentiating them into two groups, we car-
ried out the analysis of all the variables that we have introduced in our model. 
     Table 6. OLS Robust Data Panel (All variables) III 
     Source: own elaboration 
In this table we can observe the control variables and the independent variables in re-
presentation of the formal institutions. There are several significativities: "Regqua" is 
not significant; "Rulaw" is significant at 10%; "Polabs" and "Unem" are at 5% and the 
remaining ones are significant at 1%. However, despite throwing significant data, some 
can be confusing when it comes to economically reasoning, for example, it is difficult to 
argue that any of the indicators of good governance show a positive coefficient that 
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causes increases in inequality as this increases, as is the case of the variable 
"Control". This may be due to the temporary limitations in our study. 
Once we have the three equations returned, we are going to carry out a comparison 
between this three different groupings that we have carried out previously. 
 
  Table 7. OLS Robust Data Panel (all variables groups) 
    
   Source: own elaboration 
In Table 7 we can see how the signs, effects and significativities of the variables have 
varied in the three different regressions that we have carried out. Some variables suffer 
variations in terms of coefficient and significance but do not change sign. The variables 
"Control", "Goveff", "Voiaccount", "GDPpc", "Popgro" and "School" do not change in 
terms of significance or sign, they only vary in the value of the coefficient. There are 
variables that have lost significance, such as: "Regqua" that goes from being significant 
to 5% in the equation [1] to not being significant in the OLS equation, or also "Rulaw" 
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that of being significant at 1%, in the OLS equation it is significant at 10%. What we 
can highlight to a greater extent through the comparison of these three regressions, 
apart from the minimal variations that have occurred in the significance, is how the 
coefficient of determination has increased: it increases by almost 20% when passing 
from the equation [1] with only the institutional variables, to the equation (OLS) in which 
we find all the variables of our model, with a coefficient of determination of 65%. 
Next, we will use all the variables of our model using different estimates. These will be: 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effects and Random Effects. Once each of them 
is calculated, we will individually analyze the results and compare them among them. 
To finish with the empirical analysis, we use the Breusch-Pagan test and the Hausman 
test to verify which is the most accurate and appropriate type of estimation for our 
analysis. As usual, we plated the null hypothesis which indicates that the coefficient is 
equal to zero (Ho: β = 0) and the alternative in which the coefficient is different from 
zero (H1: β ≠ 0). The levels of significance chosen are, again, 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***). 
As for the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares estimate for the regression that contains all 
the variables, we will not do it again since we have already done it in the previous sec-
tion. With which, the results and conclusions are the same. 
Regarding the estimation by Fixed Effects, we carry out the calculation of the equation. 
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   Table 8. Fixed Effects Data Panel 
 
     
    Source: own elaboration  
In Table 8 we can see the results obtained according to the estimation by fixed effects. 
We only have 4 variables that are significant: 1% "Regqua", 5% "Rulaw" and "GDPpc" 
and 10% "Voiaccount". Perhaps we could lose significance when estimating fixed ef-
fects because the temporal variation is low and therefore the institutions do not change 
too much in the short term. In this way, the fixed effects have been able to capture the 
effects of the institutions, losing significance. Regarding the signs, it is noteworthy that 
all except the variable "Regqua" have negative signs, which had not happened when 
returning with all the variables until doing so through fixed effects. 
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Then, we perform the analysis of our model through random effects estimation. (Table 
9) 
   Table 9. Random Effects Data Panel 
 
    Source: own elaboration 
In this regression estimated by random effects we can find two types of significativities: 
1% are the variables "Regqua" and "GDPpc" and 5% "Rulaw" and "Popgro". The other 
variables are not significant. All the signs of this estimate are the expected ones except 
"Regqua", which is positive, which would mean an increase in inequality and we insist 
that it does not make economic sense. 
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Finally, we make a comparison of the three estimates in Table 10. 
  Table 10. OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Data Panel 
 
    Source: own elaboration 
Table 10 shows the OLS estimates represented in the previous section, the estimates 
with fixed and random effects. The variables "Control" and "Voiaccount" are significant 
at 1% in the OLS equation; nevertheless, the sign is positive of both variables, which is 
not very economically reasonable.In contrast, in the estimates made for fixed effects 
and random effects it is negative, which is more logical but does not yield significant 
data of these two variables except "Voiaccount" that is significant at 10% in the equa-
tion estimated by fixed effects. Secondly, the variables "Polabs" and "Goveff" have not 
varied in sign, they remain negative, but they are only significant in the OLS equation, 
at 5% and 1% respectively. Third, the variables "Rulaw" and "Regqua" have also main-
tained the negative sign in the three regressions but, contrary to the previous varibles, 
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have increased their significance in the FE and RE equations. Finally, the control varia-
bles yield data that approach our intuition with greater accuracy in the OLS equation 
due to the significant of these and the expected signs that are reasonable from a socio-
economic perspective. For example, it is not reasonable to think that as the secondary 
school rate increases, it translates into an increase in inequality as indicated by the 
equation estimated by fixed effects. Although this result is not really important in our 
analysis because it is a control variable, it is interesting to see this type of results be-
cause it means that our study has limitations which can yield illogical data that contra-
dict the literature. 
It is necessary to make an incision to understand these results. The estimated regres-
sions of panel data can also present a number of drawbacks. If the variation in our key 
variables is largely due to cross-sectional variations and not to regional internal varia-
tions, the estimation by fixed effects could yield misleading data (Barro, 2000). This 
means that if the causal factors that intervene in the growth are persistent, the long-
term transverse effects are included in the fixed effects of the region, causing the ex-
planatory coefficients of the endogenous variable to be less informative. Furthermore, 
as Banerjee and Duflo (2000) said, "the measurement-error bias worsens when using 
only the variation within the region, so the bias can be more severe than when using 
simple OLS”. In conclusion, Partridge (2005) came to the conclusion that when estima-
ting by fixed effects, the results can be inaccurate for analyzes in which the variations 
occur mainly in a transversal way. Unlike fixed effects, RE and Pooled OLS result in 
data closer to the standard OLS when the large part of the variation is transverse. 
Another explanation may be the one offered in the work of Clark and Linzer (2015): af-
firm that the estimate of β by means of fixed effects it can be understood as the avera-
ge of the effects within the unit of 'X' on 'Y'.That is, under certain assumptions, this es-
timator can yield data that is very dependent on the sample, that is, especially sensitive 
to random error in any data set. If we assume that there are few observations per unit, 
as is our case since we cover the year 2011 to 2016, in this case the estimates of the 
effects of 'X' on 'Y' may differ from the actual effect due solely to chance. This lack of 
robustness when estimating by FE is what is meant by high variance. 
Next, to find out if the random effects model or the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares mo-
del is more appropriate, we used the Breusch-Pagan test carried out the Lagrange 
multiplier test for random effects. The table 11 shows the results obtained. 
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   Table 11. Breusch-Pagan test 
 
       Source: own elaboration 
  
The null hypothesis of this test is that the variance of the random deviation "u" is equal 
to zero. If the test is rejected it is preferable to use the random effects method. In our 
model, we can reject the null hypothesis, so the random effects "u" are relevant and we 
prefer to use the random effects estimation than the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares. 
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   Table 12. Hausman test. 
   Source: own elaboration 
Finally, to decide and choose the fixed effects model or the random effects model, we 
use the Hausman test. The response of this test depends on the possibility of a correla-
tion between the individual error component "u" and the variables. Thus, the null hy-
pothesis (H0) of the Hausman test is that the estimators of random effects and fixed 
effects do not differ substantially. While if the H0 is rejected, the estimators do differ 
and the conclusion is that the fixed effects are more convenient than the random ef-
fects. In our model we can affirm that we have sufficient evidence to reject the null hy-
pothesis, because the estimators differ systematically, and therefore, we will use the 
estimation by fixed effects. As we have mentioned previously, choosing the estimate for 
fixed effects in our model can be somewhat contradictory or confusing and may be due 
to the limitation we have for the period of time analyzed. Surely if we choose data that 




In recent years, inequality has become a central issue in international conversations, 
calling it the challenge of our era. Inequality has a huge amount of negative conse-
quences when it exceeds certain levels, such as: environmental degradation, the mal-
functioning of political systems, lower economic growth, less freedom, poor health, 
among other socio-economic problems. However, a certain level of inequality is neces-
sary to keep growing, keeping prizes for those who are more productive and rewards 
for effort. However, each time the wealth is worse redistributed, which leads to a divi-
sion between increasingly pronounced social classes and an increase in global inequa-
lity. To introduce it in the subsequent empirical analysis, we use the Gini index in repre-
sentation of inequality, since it is the most used measure. 
On the other hand, we find formal institutions, the rules of the game, of a society. In 
order to carry out the analysis about the influence that these institutions have on 
inequality, we have used the data provided by The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI), which divides the quality of government into six indicators. Together with the 
control variables introduced, we carry out the analysis to see how they influence 
inequality levels. Through three methodologies, Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects, we analyze the influences and significativities. 
To carry out the analysis, we used data from the aforementioned variables from coun-
tries around the world from 2011 to 2016. Through the different regressions that we 
have carried out we have been able to check the influence of each variable individually 
with respect to the index of Gini and also by groups of independent variables. Thanks 
to this, we can affirm that our variables of interest contrasted individually, those of go-
vernment quality, are highly significant and reduce inequality as the coefficients of the-
se variables increase. However, in the regressions by groups of variables we have not 
obtained the expected results, probably due to the temporal limitation of our study. 
There is an important issue, which is necessary to mention. It could be said that it is a 
historical issue: what came before, the chicken or the egg? In our case we vary a little 
the question: what appeared before, inequality or corrupt, violent and unstable go-
vernments? That is, we are talking about the direction of the causality of the existence 
of inequality. It is quite complex to be able to affirm if inequality is what has led go-
vernments to act in a wrong way, or if the existence of inequality is due to the bad per-
formance of governments. In our model we have chosen to think that inequality is cau-
sed, among other causes, by bad government. For example, if a government of a de-
veloping country receives money in the form of aid to build schools, hospitals, distribute 
food and water, etc., but that money is never used for loyal purposes since the leaders 
take it for their own benefit, it is clearly the cause of inequality since the less rich are 
not being offered the opportunity to grow. 
It is logical to think, and certain results of our analysis have already hinted, that there 
are high levels of inequality that have been conditioned by the quality in the way of go-
verning, and it is also necessary to add that there is a very primary tendency in Capita-
lism, which is that the stock of wealth and income flow tend to be concentrated in a few 
hands, knowing that capitalism does not have a mechanism to prevent this and that 
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income distributions are not evenly balanced (Morgan, 2015) . So, the first thing that 
should improve and evolve is the way of governing, in the sense of having: a govern-
ment that is not corrupt, transparent, safe, with the capacity to redistribute wealth, that 
thinks of the common good and not of individual interest and impartial (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008). In this way, the levels of inequality would be reduced, thus achieving 
greater well-being in the entire population. It is what sums up that countries with a high 
"quality of government" will bring greater welfare to the population (Holmberg, Roths-
tein and Naghmeh, 2009). A possible solution based on two measures exposed in the 
work of (Derek and Borghetto, 2018) to the problem of inequality is that, on the one 
hand, there is a need for governments to focus and address the problem of inequality, 
since They are much more attentive to other scenarios such as immigration. On the 
other hand, the ability of wealthy elites to influence political agendas is necessary since 
people with great wealth are the ones who can do the most to help reduce inequality, 
but in many cases these forces may not be in force. In the case of competition and by 
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7. Apendix 
Image 1. Test for heteroskedasticity (1)  and test for autocorrelation (2), example with 
de variable “Control”. 
(1) 
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